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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INFORMATION REPORT

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**THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION**

1. [redacted] most Poles thought that a conflict between Germany and Poland was inevitable. The Poles hated the Russians, and, in the event of an East-West war, would not be willing to fight against the Americans and British. But a majority of the Poles would probably obey orders to fight against any German army, even though this would mean having to side with Russians. Poles of all political persuasions agreed, therefore, that Poland's interests would suffer in a new war regardless of which side won.

2. Few Poles had any confidence in the pretended friendship of the East German regime. In a war in which West German troops were involved, any East German contingents would change sides and join battle against the Poles.

50X1 [redacted] more effort should be made by western broadcasting stations to inform people in Eastern Europe of the existence and size of such East German forces. If people realized that the Russians had already armed the East Germans, there would perhaps be less concern about the rearmament of West Germany.

3.		the Third World War would
50X1		break out over Germany.

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The moral authority of the western powers had suffered a great blow when, as most Poles believed, the western powers agreed at Yalta to surrender Poland to the Soviet Union. Many Poles felt that the Western powers, having done little or nothing to prevent the Russians from having their will with Poland, would also do little or nothing to prevent the Germans from trying to do likewise at some time in the future.

4. [redacted] in the first years after the war, most Poles who moved to the former German territories in the West went only because of temporary economic inducements. In these days, few Poles expected Polish occupation of these territories to be permanent. At present, however, an increasingly large number of Poles had come to think that Poland might be able to keep these lands after all. Many Poles still thought of the Polish possession of them as only temporary, but the trend of opinion was in the direction indicated.
5. As regards the general balance of power between the eastern and western blocs, [redacted] time was on the side of the West, though doubtless the Soviets thought otherwise. [redacted] the rearmament of Germany and Japan would tip the balance heavily in favor of the West. Though the Soviet public was now morally ready for war, in the sense that it would be ready to fight another patriotic war if called upon to do so, the general military balance was such that the Soviet government was not likely to risk starting a war in the next few years.

#### Recruitment to the Party

6. [redacted] in the last few years there had been no significant changes in Party recruiting activities. [redacted] for example, [redacted] the Party was now making any noticeable efforts to persuade members of the technical intelligentsia to join. More attention tended to be given to recruiting young people at the universities, but few of the members so recruited were yet to be seen in the ordinary government offices.
7. Young people of proven political reliability who had been sent to the Soviet Union for schooling ([redacted] there might be several thousand of such students) were only now beginning to return to Poland in any numbers. There were a few of these supposedly bright young men employed in the State Economic Planning Commission (PKPG), but usually they were not given employment in the economic ministries. Instead, they were more likely to be assigned to teach in the universities or to work in the Party. [redacted] the young Communists there had not demonstrated any very high level of competence, and that their performance had to some extent disappointed the Party's expectations. Most government offices were still staffed mainly with non-Party people. In the GZR, only from 30 to 35 employees out of 200 were members, and only two or three of these were convinced Communists. In the planning section of the GZR, there was only one person who was a member out of 16 people employed in the section. Most of the 16 were young people who had recently graduated from the Central School of Planning and Statistics (SGPiS). They had belonged to the youth organization (ZMP) but had not volunteered to join or been pressured into joining the Party.

#### Radio Listening Habits

8. [redacted] listened to VOA, RFE, and the BBC when [redacted] in the countryside. At [redacted] home [redacted] jamming was so strong as to make it almost impossible to listen to VOA, though RFE could still

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50X1 sometimes be picked up. In a small village some 40 miles from Lodz, how-  
 50X1 ever, [ ] able to hear VOA on a [ ] homemade crystal  
 50X1 set.

9. [ ] in the countryside everything heard on VOA was accepted as  
 50X1 the gospel, whereas in the cities listeners tended to be more sparing  
 50X1 in their praise of western stations. The [ ] liked the commentaries  
 50X1 of BBC and the news broadcasts of VOA and RFE. [ ] objected to the broad-  
 50X1 casting of music on VOA and RFE Polish-language programs. The music on  
 50X1 the domestic Polish stations was very good, and it was foolish for the  
 50X1 western stations to waste time broadcasting pieces of music which, be-  
 50X1 cause of the jamming, would never be satisfactory for the musically-  
 50X1 inclined.

10. [ ] no information on the spread of wired radio, but [ ]  
 50X1 [ ] it was used in villages which had no electricity and where the  
 50X1 people were too poor to have their own radios. [ ] village of  
 50X1 Barkowice Mokre near Piotrkow did not have either electricity or wired  
 50X1 radio. [ ] doubted that anyone who could afford his own radio would be  
 50X1 content with only wired radio, no matter what the regime did to encourage  
 50X1 people to subscribe to it.

#### 50X1 Religious Situation

11. [ ] Communist propaganda had had little influence on the  
 50X1 religious convictions of the Polish people. [ ]  
 50X1 [ ] more people went to church now than  
 50X1 did before the war. Members of the intelligentsia and the professional  
 50X1 classes had formerly been somewhat anti-clerical, but now they too seemed  
 50X1 to display more attachment to the Church than in the past. In the pre-  
 50X1 war years the students also had tended to be free-thinkers, but at pre-  
 50X1 sent more university students could be seen attending church than ever  
 50X1 before. A possible explanation of this was that the students were now  
 50X1 recruited mainly from the children of workers and peasants, so that the  
 50X1 increased devotion to religion to be seen in the schools was perhaps  
 50X1 more the result of a change in the origins and social background of the  
 50X1 students than of any actual return to religion by non-church-goers among  
 50X1 the young people.

12. [ ] heard various reports of the closing of monasteries in the fall of  
 50X1 1954 and supposed that there had been a concerted drive on them then.  
 50X1 Thus, a well-known monastery in Bielany north of Warsaw was closed, the  
 50X1 monks sent elsewhere, and the buildings taken for use by a new government-  
 50X1 sponsored Academy of Catholic Theology.

50X1 [ ] the story was told that the monks and nuns were  
 50X1 being sent to join larger consolidated monasteries and convents elsewhere,  
 50X1 but no one ever heard of where such consolidated institutions were to be  
 50X1 found.

#### Hooliganism and Morale of the Youth

13. [ ] juvenile delinquency was indeed a serious problem in  
 50X1 Poland. The regime's efforts to suppress it had not succeeded, and were  
 50X1 not likely to do so. Juvenile delinquency and hooliganism were caused  
 50X1 by the poverty of the population, and there would be juvenile delinquents  
 50X1 as long as the people were as poor as they were. Life in Poland was hard  
 50X1 and unpleasant for a person who was honest, but could be relatively soft  
 50X1 and comfortable for the person willing to steal a bit. Consequently,  
 50X1 nearly everyone who could indulge in a certain amount of thievery of  
 50X1 state property. The socialist system, particularly in retail trade, was

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practically a school for thievery. Even the regime had to some extent tacitly come to accept a high rate of theft as normal. In the past, persons caught stealing property worth only a few zlotys might be sent to prison. Now a bookkeeper or clerk in a state store who was caught stealing thousands of zlotys might only be obliged to repay the money stolen.

14. Young people who misbehaved in public were called hooligans, and might be punished as such by the authorities, but most of these hooligans were really thieves. Many of the hooligans were young people who dressed and lived well and who either had no work at all or who, if they did work, lived well beyond their visible income. It was obvious to everyone that they were thieves, for how else could they have found the money which they spent so freely?

15. A [ ] director of a House of Young Workers (Dom Mlodego Robotnika) in Warsaw told [ ] that a considerable proportion of his tenants, while perhaps not qualifying as hooligans by the above definitions, behaved like hooligans. The young workers were mostly single young men from the countryside whose pay as laborers in the construction industry was relatively good (2,000 zlotys or more per month in some cases) and whose living costs in the canteens and dormitories were not particularly high. They drank heavily, fought with knives, and generally misbehaved.

16. The public tended to be relatively indifferent to the problem. Hardly any one cared that such young people might have gotten their money by the theft and sale of state property. Disorderly behaviour while drunk was also tolerated by the public, because in Poland, as everywhere, one could say that in practice there were two sets of laws: one for the sober man and one for the drunken. [ ] was not uncommon, for example, for members of the public on a streetcar to remonstrate with a policeman who might want to take into custody drunken citizens overheard abusing the regime and its leaders. The loudness of the government's propaganda campaign against hooliganism was in part a result of the genuine helplessness of the authorities in the face of the problem of hooliganism, drunkenness, and juvenile delinquency in general. It was impossible to pass a law saying that young people could not dress well, wear their hair long, and drink a bit, even though everybody knew that such young people were in effect, though perhaps not in conscious intention, showing their indifference to the lessons of Communism.

[ ] in the Soviet Union there were perhaps enough differences between classes that such categories of favored youths would be much in the public eye, but [ ] had not heard of this as being of much importance in Poland.

#### 50X1 Imprisonment of Former Members of Wartime Underground Army (AK)

17. [ ] although a considerable number of the more intelligent or important members of the AK were now in prison, [ ] most of the persons who had been in the AK were now at liberty. As a rule, the persons who were in prison were ones on whom the authorities had found additional grounds for arrest.

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orders. The case remained a black mark on his record, however, and he supposed that his later difficulties with the authorities could basically be traced to this period.

19. It was possible that the regime had lately decided to recheck the cases of former members of the AK, [redacted]

50X1 [redacted] the case against [redacted] chief in the AK, who was arrested in 1950 and sentenced to fifteen years in prison, had been reviewed. His sentence had not been shortened. A few people in the same case arrested at the same time, however, were new out of prison.

50X1 Sabotage and Resistance Activities

20. [redacted] there was little or no sabotage practiced in Poland at present. The last case of sabotage [redacted] was of some damage to the rail line between Krakow and Katowice in 1952, and [redacted] not [redacted] sure that even this had really been sabotage. From time to time one heard of criminal bands in the forests, and [redacted] one such band, but [redacted] their activities had any political importance. The band about [redacted] was perhaps typical of these. It consisted of seven or eight young men from a few villages near Piotrkow, south of Lodz [redacted]

50X1 The men were forest workers who carried out an occasional robbery of state stores and other likely sources of cash. Several of them were killed and the rest captured by a squad of soldiers who surprised them in a dugout in the woods in 1953. The identity of the men had been known to the police for some time, probably from a denunciation, and the men had been living an illegal existence away from home for many months before the end came. [redacted]

50X1 [redacted] the men who belonged to such groups were for the most part ordinary criminals such as one found in every country, Communist or otherwise.

21. When people heard that Poles abroad had been sent back to Poland as spies and that the western powers were carrying on espionage in Poland, hardly any one was surprised or displeased. It was supposed that there was a fairly well-organized anti-Communist underground biding its time for better days. The fact that no one ever met anybody who personally knew anything about it and that no one ever saw any signs of its activity was attributed to the great need for secrecy in such matters.

#### Soviet Advisers in Poland

22. There was no Soviet adviser at the Central Agricultural Equipment Supply Office (CZR) but occasionally a Soviet machine tractor station expert assigned to the Polish Ministry of Agriculture in Warsaw visited [redacted]

50X1 [redacted] During his visit he expressed great interest in the size of the Polish production series for spare parts, and claimed to be horrified when he heard that for some parts needed on the old American tractors the Poles had production series of only a few thousand units per year. The Soviet expert declared that in the USSR the shortest authorized production series of parts of agricultural machines was 100,000 units. He added that in the Soviet Union the ATZ, the STZ, and the S-60 tractors were no longer built and, in accordance with the Soviet practice of doing everything on the biggest scale or not doing it at all, no more parts were made for these models.

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23. The Soviet advisers were not usually well-informed about anything except their narrow field of specialization, or at any rate rarely provided information outside their subject. [redacted] office had asked the Ministry of Agriculture many times for detailed information on the organizational arrangements of the Soviet agricultural machinery supply planning offices but the information was never provided. The Poles had asked for it to help them carry out reorganizations and improvements in their own planning offices.

#### Mechanization of Polish Agriculture

24. [redacted] the number of tractors in Poland [redacted] was from 44,000 to 50,000 [redacted] Polish production of Ursus 45 horse power tractors in 1953 amounted to about 12,000 machines. In 1953 there were still about 8,000 old American tractors received from UNRRA on the inventories of the state farms, though in practice most of these were probably not in use any more. Despite the high percentage of tractors deadlined because of lack of spare parts or on the scrap heap because of improper maintenance, the fact was that Polish agriculture at present really had more tractors than it needed. Shortages of tractor drivers and of various kinds of tractor-drawn agricultural machinery were such that [redacted] more tractors were presently being delivered to the countryside than could be used under the existing organization of agriculture.
25. In addition to the Ursus 45, considerable use was made of the track-type KD-35, originally imported from the Soviet Union but now also made in Poland, and of the Zetor 25, a wheeled tractor made in Czechoslovakia. There were also a few Soviet-made Stalines-80 tractors, primarily on very large state farms. The Zetor was a good machine, but the Czechs charged too high prices for it and its spare parts. Source thought that the tractor of the future in Poland would be the KD-35 and that eventually this would be the standard machine for most of Polish agriculture. It was planned that eventually the Ursus factory would stop making Ursus tractors and make instead KD-35's. At first, it was proposed to make a wheeled version of the KD-35, to be called the "Bialorus," but it was found that the pulling power of this model was too light. [redacted] the tracked model KD-35 would, therefore, replace the Ursus. 1954 was perhaps the last year in which the Ursus would be made. The only western-made tractors planned to be imported into Poland in 1953 or 1954 were ten or so Fiat garden tractors intended for Polish agricultural research stations.
26. [redacted] in 1953 some 450 S-4 combines were imported from the Soviet Union. There were plans to make this combine in Poland. It was doubtful whether any such Polish-made machines had been delivered to their end-users during 1954. The 1954 plan for the manufacture of agricultural equipment in Poland called for domestic production to the value of about 900 million zlotys. The agricultural machinery import plan for the same year provided for the purchase of about 100 million zlotys worth of foreign equipment, of which probably more than half was from the Soviet Union.
27. The so-called new course in agriculture did not involve any significant changes in plans for production of farm machinery during 1954. The only difference was that after the fall of 1953 it became easier to get the Polish factories to meet their commitments for the production of spare parts, i.e., such factories were thereafter obliged to

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give a certain priority to agriculture which it had not enjoyed before. Implementation of the government's decision to give more attention to agriculture did not really begin until after a public speech on the subject by the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Zenon Nowak, in autumn 1953, though even then the changes made were small ones and their practical consequences not really very great. Thus, in late 1953 the Ministry authorized the CZR to release half of the production of some of the lighter pieces of auxiliary farm machinery for sale to private farmers via the agricultural retail supply services (Centrala Rolniczych Spoldzielni-Samopomoc Chlopska - CRSSCH). At the same time, the qualification was made that the equipment should be made available only if it was surplus to the needs of the state farms and collectives. Formerly none had been available for private buyers. There was also a reduction in the retail prices which the private farmers had to pay for farm equipment, but even so the authorized prices for private sale were considerably higher than the prices paid by the state farms and the cooperatives. The prices for goods sold to the public were usually about twice those charged for goods sold by one state enterprise to another.

28. About ninety percent of the planned supply of agricultural equipment was allotted to the three main groups of users in the agricultural field: the state farms (PGR), the machine tractor stations (POM), and the CRSSCH mentioned above. The remaining ten per cent was divided among the other ministries, such as mining, interior, defense, and so on, nearly all of which had some farm land under their control.

#### Supply of Spare Parts for Agricultural Machinery

29. Although, as has been mentioned, the lack of spare parts for tractors did not really handicap Polish agriculture, the difficulties encountered by the Central Agricultural Equipment Supply Office (CZR) in obtaining these parts illustrate the inherent inefficiencies of Communist economic planning. - [REDACTED] the CZR had a warehouse at Szecylerne containing approximately 40 million zlotys worth of spare parts for American-made tractors supplied by UNRRA. About a quarter of the parts were originally obtained from UNRRA, and the other three-quarters had been manufactured locally at great expense. [REDACTED] almost the entire 40 million zlotys investment in these parts would eventually have to be written off completely. The warehouse had been stocked, and each year new parts had been manufactured for it, because each year the state farms and tractor stations had continued to list worn-out and junked tractors in their inventories. In 1953, 8,000 of the original 12,000 or so UNRRA tractors were still carried on the books of the using organizations even though source was sure that few of the machines were still serviceable. The planning office experts realized that in these circumstances it was folly to continue to produce spare parts for these tractors but dared not ignore the using organizations' estimates of future demand lest they later be accused of sabotaging the economy. For their part, the officials of the state farms and tractor stations who submitted the spare parts requisitions were either too new at their jobs, too stupid, too frightened, or too prudent to do anything but submit the largest requisitions possible for every conceivable piece of equipment carried on the books. The turnover of personnel in the planning sections of the tractor stations was [REDACTED] great

30. The topmost officials who alone could set right such problems rarely did so until long after great sums of money, many hundreds and thousands of man-hours, and vast quantities of raw materials had been

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irretrievably lost. Even for such officials, it was easiest to take at face value the figures at hand, regardless of how inaccurate or misleading they were. They preferred to order very comfortable margins of everything, rather than to risk ordering fewer parts than might be needed, and rather than be possibly accused of wastefulness when they would write off unuseable equipment or stores as a dead loss.

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In 1952, the value of agricultural machinery spare parts (excluding tractor parts) distributed to using organizations in Poland was about 80 million zlotys. Experts in making their calculations as to needs in the plan for 1953, recommended that parts be acquired in the value of 110 million zlotys. A compilation of the planned requirements for spare parts submitted by the using organizations, however, showed a claimed need for 130 million zlotys worth of parts in 1953. 110 million was adequate, but the responsible official of the Ministry of Agriculture, Deputy-Minister Czeslaw Domagala, ruled that the two estimates should be combined by taking the highest individual figure for each item in the plan. This gave a total of 160 million zlotys as the value of the parts needed for 1953.

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Since this figure was twice the 1952 figure, the State Economic Planning Commission (PKPG) threw out Domagala's submission, and approved instead the 110 million total.

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Mistakes of judgment in planning for the supply of even individual items sometimes cost great sums of money. Ever since 1951 the authorities had ordered that arrangements be made to manufacture certain spare parts of the Czech-made Zetor tractor in Poland. The Polish-Czech trade agreements obligated the Czechs to supply Zetor parts of a specified value, but the Czechs were so short on raw materials they constantly fell behind the delivery schedules. In 1951, therefore, a high-level decision was taken to start manufacturing engine cylinder block sleeves (Tuleje) for the Zetor. If they could be made in Poland, the Czechs would have to supply considerably more of other parts. Production was accordingly begun at a factory in Poznan with such urgency that the items were put into series production before they had been adequately tested. When they were installed in the tractors many expanded and ruptured the entire engine blocks, and even the serviceable ones had a useful life of only 300 hours compared to the 1200 hours of the original Zetor parts. The police were called in and efforts were even made to blame the affair on one Leon Czajkowski, who had been general director of the Polish tractor parts manufacturing and overhaul organization (Technical Agricultural Service - Techniczna Obsluga Rolnictwa - CZTOR). Czajkowski was already in prison as he had been arrested at the end of 1952, supposedly for having visited West Berlin while on an official trip to East Berlin. the directive to manufacture these parts still stood, though there seemed to be a general belief that nobody on the working level cared to deal with the problem. In effect, the directive might as well have been rescinded because the responsible officials had all more or less washed their hands of the affair. It was easier to make excuses as to why it had been necessary to give other tasks priority than to do the job. The experts joked that they had a choice of deliberately neglecting to do the work and getting six months in prison, or of doing the job and getting ten years. In actual fact, however, prison sentences for technicians were not common, as even the most unlucky expert could usually refer to a piece of paper giving him very explicit orders to do whatever it was that had gone wrong.

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34. [redacted] the value of spare parts (including wheels and tires) supplied for tractors in Poland in the 1954 plan was about 300 million zlotys, as compared to 280 million in 1953, and 240 million in 1952. About 120 million zlotys in the 1954 figure went for Zetor parts and about 70 million for Ursus parts. The prices paid for imported machinery and parts varied from one country to the next. In general, Czech and Soviet farm equipment was very costly, and East German the cheapest. Polish-made farm equipment was less expensive than imported, but Polish-made spare parts were more expensive. These differences still existed, but since 1953, apparently for internal bookkeeping reasons, the Poles have carried on their books at one price all farm equipment with the same rated work capacity, regardless of where the items might have come from or how much they might actually have cost. The changeover in accounting practice created an enormous amount of work for the planning office. The organization was expected to show a profit under the new price system as under the old. The planned profit for 1953 had been seven million zlotys out of a turnover of about 400 million zlotys. The actual profit in 1953 was about 10 million.
35. [redacted] a German translation of an article from the Warsaw newspaper Trybune Ludu of January 12, 1955, about the enormous number of defective machines produced by various Polish factories. The article stated that only 467 of the 707 tractors made by Ursus in November 1954 were accepted by the "acceptance committee", only 137 of the 250 mowers made by the harvesting machine factory in Plock were accepted, and so on. [redacted] while the figures were probably correct, the actual situation in the industry was not as serious as the newspaper pretended.
36. The Ursus factory, by Polish standards, was a generally efficient and well-run establishment. Nevertheless, as it depended on other less efficient factories for some of the parts used in the manufacture of tractors, it very frequently happened that, because of shortages of some parts, tractors would be finished without such parts. In the past, such machines were usually passed by Ursus inspection commission and accepted by the CZR, on the understanding that the CZR would supply the missing parts itself and would be compensated for them by Ursus. This arrangement worked satisfactorily for both parties, because Ursus got credit for delivering the tractors, and CZR got the tractors. It was usually easy for CZR to procure satisfactory quantities of the missing parts because CZR was willing to have lower-quality parts put in the tractors as repairs than the factory itself could use in making the machines. Thus, it sometimes happened that CZR bought and used parts which Ursus had scrapped as sub-standard (rejects). In addition, CZR had access to Ursus parts made by the factories of the Central Administration of the Technical Agricultural Service (CZTOR). The latter had had to go into the parts manufacturing business because Ursus had so concentrated on making new machines that it had no parts left over for repair purposes. The parts made by the factories of CZTOR were sometimes as much as three times as expensive as those made by Ursus, but this was unimportant when, as in the case described above, Ursus paid CZR for them.
37. As a concrete example of the above, [redacted] CZR often took delivery of Ursus tractors on which some essential parts of the diesel fuel injection system were lacking. Ursus had had trouble making these parts and so was willing, in this case, to pay CZR for the cost of installing Zetor parts in their place. In the summer of 1953, however, the increasing number of complaints about the acceptance of unserviceable equipment caused Eng. Leon Rzendowski, one of the Under-secretaries of State for Agriculture, to order that the agricultural supply office CZR assume responsibility for the inspecting commissions

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passing on farm equipment delivered by Polish factories. Rzendowski issued the order after hearing of a particularly glaring case of the production of defective portable insecticide sprayers needed for fighting the Colorado beetle. A CZR inspection team reported that the entire production of the sprayers, made by small workshops belonging to the Ministry of Small Industries and Crafts, was defective and, what was worse, couldn't even be repaired. Hundreds and hundreds of such sprayers had been made [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The probable explanation of the Trybuna Ludu story, therefore, was that the new arrangements for acceptance of farm equipment were only now coming into force, and that the CZR inspectors were using their authority to the limit. Their motive for doing so was probably the natural desire to create alibis for an expected underfulfillment of their own plans, particularly as the end of the planning year was drawing near. The machines themselves were thus probably not especially carelessly or sloppily made, despite Trybuna Ludu's claim that they were.

#### State Economic Planning Commission (PKPG)

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[REDACTED] Hilary Minc had not been actively concerned with the work of the State Economic Planning Commission (PKPG) since 1949. It was generally known that Minc has suffered from diabetes for some years. Even while he was still at the PKPG he was rarely seen around his office or at meetings in the PKPG.

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In August or September 1949, an elaborate six-year plan for the period 1950 through 1955 which Minc had worked out with great care was peremptorily scrapped on orders from above. At that time, [REDACTED] the Central Administration of the Clothing Industry [REDACTED] plan was thrown out and orders given that new lower targets be set for the clothing industry [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there were similar changes of plan for practically the whole economy, even though plans then being worked on were so far advanced that they had already been printed for distribution within the government.

[REDACTED] In these, and in all of the other plans the changes were all in the direction of still greater increases in heavy industry, and of cuts in the planned figures for the output of consumers' goods. [REDACTED] the changes were probably made under Soviet orders and against the better judgment of Minc, who for this reason thereafter took less interest in his work.

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Adam Wang, the director-general of the PKPG, was the heart of the organization, and in day-to-day work was perhaps more important than the commission's chairman Eugeniusz Szvr. [REDACTED]

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42. [redacted] in the last few years the PKPG had steadily lost influence. Decisions which were formerly made by the PKPG were more and more decided by the Council of Ministers or by the Central Committee of the Party. Bierut was the most important figure in the government at all times in recent years. When he gave up the premiership to take the secretaryship of the Party, this meant only that questions which the PKPG couldn't resolve were sometimes settled by the Central Committee instead of by the Council of Ministers. In practice, however, the distinction was not a great one since there was considerable overlap in membership of the Central Committee of the PZPR and the Council of Ministers, and since in recent years more and more of the influential political figures in the Central Committee had taken over economic ministries themselves.
43. The decline in the prestige and influence of the PKPG was seen in the fact that when a new schedule of prices was ordered in 1952, the work of fixing the new prices was given to a special commission under Eng. Tadeusz Gede, new vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers. The officials of the prices section of the PKPG were not informed of the impending changes but were allowed to carry on their work unaware of the fact that practically everything they were working on would have to be redone.
44. [redacted] whatever may have been the case in the other Communist countries, in Poland, heavy industry and war industry enjoyed the same priority they were given when the plan was changed late in 1949. Greater efforts were no doubt being made to fulfill the plans for mechanization of agriculture, for example, but the plans themselves had not been changed. [redacted] it was impossible that there could have been any drastic revision of the existing plans prior to October 1954 [redacted] The only cuts in investments which he knew of had been of investments in the so-called "B" or non-essential category, i.e., investments in offices, non-industrial construction, club houses, theaters, and the like. An exception had been made for Warsaw, where "B" category investments were still permitted. Thus, construction had been continued on cultural buildings in Warsaw, but no money had been allotted for finishing the state theater in Lodz. In short, [redacted] the new course about which one heard so much in the West was really a propaganda production, and that there had definitely been no significant shift in emphasis in Poland from heavy to light industry, or from military to civilian production.
45. [redacted] in the spring of 1954 there had been a reorganization of the PKPG, but [redacted] had not heard of any significant further devolution of planning authority beyond that already practiced for several years. The reorganization had consisted of the division of the numerous departments of the PKPG into three distinct sections: production, under Mieczyslaw Lesz; trade, perhaps directly under Szyr [redacted] and supply (zaopatrzenie), under Adam Wang. The section under Wang was the most important. The reorganization did not involve any changes in the responsibilities of Franciszek Blinowski, who continued as before to occupy himself mainly with manpower planning and social questions.
46. [redacted] it would be a mistake to attribute any particular importance to this reorganization. The planning machinery in Poland, as doubtless elsewhere in the Communist world, was always being changed. [redacted] never [redacted] had the instructions for the planning work remained the same two years in a row. Each of the changes could be likened to the movements of a man with insomnia: first he turns on one side, and

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then on the other, ever seeking a more comfortable position in bed and never finding it. The planning method of Poland was the method of trial and error.

#### Adjustment of Wage Rates in 1954

47. [redacted] in the fall of 1954 the basic wage rates for labor in the construction industry were raised somewhat and at the same time a ceiling was put on the payment of overtime and of output bonuses. Overtime rates could not be paid for more than 120 hours per year, and output bonuses could not exceed a maximum of 30 per cent of the basic wage payment. The change generally meant a cut in take-home pay. Engineers who had received from 2,100 to 2,500 zlotys per month thereafter received from 300 to 500 zlotys less.
48. A new wage list for medical doctors was also introduced in October. The main change was an increase in payments to medical personnel holding administrative or public health posts involving no contact with patients. The increases were made to help recruitment for such posts. In the past, few doctors had been willing to take such jobs both because the pay was not particularly good and because the work caused the doctors to grow rusty in their profession. The earnings of source's wife and a sister, both of whom were medical doctors treating the public, were little affected by the change. His wife's monthly pay was about 1,400 zlotys plus an additional 400 zlotys for night duty.
49. Salaries of university professors were doubled in October [redacted] information from [redacted] Lodz. A full professor now received 3,000 zlotys base pay per month. [redacted] there had been no changes in salaries of white-collar workers. [redacted]
- [redacted] Officials of the second class received about 1,600 and of the first class about 1,800. Above these, there were the so-called statute categories: S-3 with about 2,200 per month, S-2 at 2,700, and S-1 at about 3,200. The decision as to which rate an official at this level would be paid was made individually by the Minister so that men with the same titles might receive different salaries. In the Central Agricultural Equipment Supply Office (CZR), the deputy directors, called "statute directors", were mostly classified as S-3 and the chief of the office was called a first statute director and was classified as S-2. The S-1 classification was generally held by directors of the major departments of a Ministry. In agriculture, the directors-general of the CZTOR and the CZPOM were probably classified as S-1. [redacted]
- [redacted] a deputy minister might have a base salary around 4,500 zlotys per month. Almost all of these officials received additional money, however, for work as members of various commissions, for duty travel, and so on. Source's extra earnings above his 1,500 base pay amounted to from 500 to 800 zlotys per month.
50. [redacted] in general the best paid workers were those employed by small enterprises. Such enterprises were able to juggle their books to the advantage of their employees in a way which the closely-inspected larger shops and factories could not do. [redacted]
- [redacted] The authorized norms for such construction allowed one scale of pay for pouring cement from wheelbarrows rolled up a ramp and another higher scale when the cement was lifted to the top of the forms in buckets on hand drawn pulleys. As a result, the enterprise always reported that the cement

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had been carried by bucket, though in fact ramps were built and wheelbarrows used. Since the authorities had tried to regulate every possible detail, and since the persons given the task of preparing the regulations were really not themselves as qualified as they should have been, there were inevitably many loopholes which the small enterprises could use to increase the earnings of their staffs.

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51.

Council of Ministers

- a. First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium, Zenon Nowak. [REDACTED]  
50X1 [REDACTED] it was generally known in government agricultural circles that  
50X1 Nowak was responsible for many of the government's decisions in  
50X1 agriculture. Before 1953, however, Piotr Jaroszewicz, now the Min-  
50X1 ister for Mining, had been the man who seemed to decide agricultural  
50X1 questions. [REDACTED]

Committee of Public Security

- b. [REDACTED] chairman Wladyslaw Dworakowski had been secretary  
50X1 of the Party in Lodz from 1947 to 1949 [REDACTED]  
50X1 [REDACTED]

Ministry for Industrial Construction

- c. [REDACTED] Minister Dr. Eng. Czeslaw Babinski had studied in  
50X1 the USSR and had later received a doctorate in the chemistry of  
50X1 synthetic fibers at the Lodz Polytechnic. [REDACTED]  
50X1 [REDACTED]  
50X1 [REDACTED]  
50X1 [REDACTED]

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Ministry of Finance

- d. The heart of the ministry was its director-general Blass (fmu), who [redacted] along with Adam Wang of the PKPG and Czeslaw Babinski, [redacted] one of the three cleverest men in the Polish government.

Ministry of Mining

- e. Vice Minister Franciszek Waniolka was chairman of the former Central Bureau of Economic Materials (CUGM) from 1951 until 1953, when it was merged with the PKPG, in imitation of the merging of the corresponding offices in the Soviet Union, GOSNAH and GOSPLAN. Waniolka had a reputation for being very strong politically.

Ministry for Internal Trade

- f. Minister Marian Minor was president of the Lodz provincial government from about 1950 to 1952, in succession to the man who later became Chief of Office of the Council of Ministers, Kazimierz Mijal.

Ministry of Foreign Trade

- g. Undersecretary of State. Czeslaw Bajer, was a clever man of about 55 years who before the war had worked for a while [redacted] in the social insurance office in Lodz. [redacted]

Ministry of State Control

- h. Undersecretary of State Stefan Kuhl was formerly in the Ministry of Agriculture as deputy to Jan Dab-Neciol from about 1950 to 1952.

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Ministry of Education

- j. The wife of Minister of Education Witold Jarosinski worked in the planning department of the Ministry of Agriculture. She was also listed as an adviser to the Minister of Agriculture. Before taking her present job, she had been chief of the financial section of the State Central Administration of the State Agricultural Machine Center (CZPOM). She was an intelligent woman.

Ministry of State Agricultural Farms

- k. Former Minister Hilary Chelchowski had a reputation as being very strong politically. Nobody knew how he survived in his job, as the ministry was not at all well-run.

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[redacted] Bodalski had been a member of the ZSL, peasant party. Undersecretary of State Marion Gotowiec, a man of about 50, was a former rector of an agricultural school in Olsztyn. He did not have any Party history and was said to have little political influence, but he was very energetic and was a good organizer. He was probably a soils expert. Undersecretary Stanislaw Tkaczow had formerly been in the Ministry of Agriculture. His place there was taken by Domagala. Tkaczow was said to have strong political backing, and to be unafraid of making decisions on his own.

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[redacted] In the State Farms Ministry, however, mistakes were disastrous, since the employees continued to draw their pay whether the farms produced anything or not. Undersecretary of State Zygmunt Berling was in charge of personnel and educational questions in the ministry. Another high official of the ministry was a woman of Jewish origin named Zmijewska (fnu), the director of the mechanization department of the PGR Ministry. She had been director of mechanization in the Ministry of Agriculture in 1951. It was said that she lost that position in the anti-Semitic action

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Ministry for the Chemical Industry

1. Undersecretary of State Kazimierz Olszewski was a young athletic fellow, a good skier, who had been the head of the investments section of a synthetic yarn factory in Zielona Gora. He came to the ministry when the former Minister, Akerman (fnu), was made the scapegoat for a disastrous explosion which destroyed a powder factory in Bydgoszcz in 1951 or 1952.

Ministry for Small Industries and Crafts

- m. this ministry was split into two smaller ministries in October 1954. It had been supposed that Undersecretary Mikolaj Olszewski would become the president of a new Central Office of Cooperatives (Centralny Urzad Spoldzielczosci), but instead Minister Adam Zebrowski got that job and Olszewski remained to run the Ministry, either as full or acting minister.

The operation of such cooperatives was a very lucrative business since very high fees could be earned from the industries being serviced or supplied when kickbacks were passed about in the proper places.

Ministry of Light Industry

- n. Minister Eugeniusz Stawinski

It was said that his work as minister was done for him by one Alexander Olszewski, the very intelligent director general of the ministry.

Ministry of Agriculture

- o. Undersecretary of State Marian Jaworski concerned himself with agricultural education; Undersecretary Czeslaw Domagala supervised mechanization, supply, POM, and TOR questions; Undersecretary Professor Dr. Mieczyslaw Czaja was a specialist who apparently took care of scientific questions and perhaps the raising of livestock. Minister Edmund Pszczolkowski took direct charge of planning questions, besides supervising in more general fashion the activities of the other parts of the ministry. As has been suggested elsewhere in this report, the most intelligent official in the ministry was Undersecretary of State Eng. Leon Rzendowski.

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Ministry of Higher Education and Science

- p. Undersecretary of State Dr. Osman Achmatowicz formerly taught at Lodz Polytechnic Institute. [redacted] Achmatowicz had been a professor of physics. He was said to be very intelligent. Undersecretary Eng. Henryk Golanski was in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce as a deputy to Minc in 1947, and was later a deputy to Minister of Light Industry Stawinski. Golanski was taken out of economic work when many of the important economic jobs were given to stronger political figures, around 1949. For a time he was the president of the Central Bureau of Vocational Training (CUSZ). [redacted]

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Miscellaneous

52.

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[redacted] in October the daily supply of butter for the city of Lodz was cut from 20 tons to ten tons. The cut was stated to have been made to divert butter to East Germany. [redacted] the report was correct, as butter was indeed very short in Lodz after October 1954 [redacted]

53.

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[redacted] There was not much talk of the exile leaders, or of the government-in-exile, and all that people knew of them was what they heard on RFE.

54.

Hardly anyone in Poland had any confidence in the so-called New Economic Course or believed that political or economic conditions in Poland would get better in the future. Titoism was impossible in Poland with the present Communist leadership. Bierut was the most influential man in Poland. Berman and Zawadzki were thought of as possible successors if Bierut were to die. Mazur, Nowak, and Dworakowski were also generally thought to be very important.

55.

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[redacted] For the public at large, the role of the secret police at the end of 1954 was the same as it had been for several years previously. Some security controls in 1954 were tighter than they had been in the past. Thus, in 1954 a new law was passed on the movement of people to Warsaw, and it was ordered that only persons believed to be supporters of the regime would be allowed to move permanently to Warsaw. There were many politically unreliable persons in Warsaw, but they had either been there before the order was issued, or they were there without being registered as inhabitants of the city. In the latter case, they either commuted from outside Warsaw or they, and their employing organizations, connived at their illegal residence in the capital by listing them as on temporary duty from somewhere else. Shortage of housing may have been a factor in the enforcement of this rule, but source was certain that security considerations, and the desire to make Warsaw a dependable center for the Communists, were of primary importance.

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56. [ ] the supply of electric current was one of the weakest links in the Polish economy, and that it would certainly be many years before adequate supplies of current were available for the villages.

50X1 [ ] the plan for the electrification of the villages had been a bad failure. From figures he had seen, the quantity of materials which would be used by the Central Administration for Agricultural Electrification (CZER) in the period of the six-year plan from 1950 through 1955 would probably not be more than the amount originally planned to be used only in the first two years of the plan. This was of some importance because in 1951 [ ] Prof. Dyzma Galaaj, the rector of an agricultural school in Olsztyn, that he (Galaaj) personally thought it would not be possible to socialize village labor before electricity had been brought to all of the villages. Galaaj spoke openly about the eventual suppression of all private farming. Galaaj was a friend of Stefan Ignar, the Vice-Chairman of the Council of State, and had visited the Soviet Union with a Polish agricultural delegation several years ago. [ ] Galaaj would be transferred to a teaching job in Krakow.

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57. [ ] everyone in Poland talked about the affair, believed the truth of Swiatlo's revelations broadcast on western radio stations, and enjoyed the embarrassment the disclosures had doubtless caused the regime. [ ]

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